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In Case You Missed It: China Dream 
April 5, 2010 in In Case You Missed It by The China Beat | 2 comments 
By Christopher R. Hughes 
Liu Mingfu 刘明福, China Dream: The Great Power Thinking and Strategic 
Positioning of China in the Post-American Age (Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei 
zhanlue dingwei). (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2010). 
China Dream, by Colonel Liu Mingfu, a professor at Beijing’s National Defense University, is the latest 
of several books to speculate on how China can displace the leadership of the United States after the 
global economic crisis. Understandably, Liu’s military background has led to conjecture over whether 
his views reflect the ambitions of the PLA or even China’s leaders. Yet China Dream is most interesting 
not so much for what it recommends for foreign and defense policies, as for what it says about the 
deployment of nationalistic themes in the debates over China’s domestic politics. 
As with works like Jiang Rong’s Wolf Totem (2004), and the 2009 title Unhappy China (co-written by 
Huang Jisu, Liu Yang, Song Jiang, Song Xiaojun, and Wang Xiaodong), China Dream contains much 
that will be of interest to anyone monitoring the belief in China’s racial supremacy, militarism and 
political voluntarism. Yet, although Liu joins the chorus calling for a stronger military, it is wrong to 
present him as an adventurist hawk. He is even prepared to acknowledge that the United States has 
made some positive contributions to the world, quoting Mao’s view that the good American people 
should be separated from the bad interest groups who drive its anti-China policies. He proposes that 
war can be avoided if the United States behaves itself and China gives it enough time to adjust to the 
age of “yellow fortune”, a synthesis of the superior civilisation of the East with the best elements of 
the West. 
This is quite different from the venomous anti-Americanism found in some of the authors of Unhappy 
China, or the influential geopolitical  thinker Zhang Wenmu, a professor at the Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics. Combined with other elements of the book, this raises the possibility 
that China Dream reflects concerns in the military to divert the nationalist wave away from a show 
down with the United States. This view becomes more compelling when the book shifts its focus 
steadily towards a strong critique of what it regards as the low status of the military and the 
corruption of the current political elite. 
This trajectory can be seen in the way that Liu addresses the orthodoxy of China’s “peaceful rise”. On 
the one hand he is happy to align with the leadership by citing Hu Jintao’s statement to the 17th CCP 
Congress as evidence that China will not be a hegemonic or expansionist power. Yet he then goes on 
to criticize those who harbour naïve illusions about the intentions of the United States because they do 
not understand that concepts like “peaceful world” and “harmonious world” can only be realised in the 
context of an international balance of power. 
In case the relevance of this for contemporary debates is lost, Liu finishes this argument with a 
critique of Zheng Bijian, the architect of the “peaceful rise” orthodoxy. Agreeing that China will not 
become a “hegemonic” power, Liu differs from Zheng by insisting that great military power is still 
necessary to protect national security, uphold world peace and achieve unification. A country with a 
big economy and no military, he concludes, is like a plump sheep waiting in the market. 
The significance of this argument becomes clearer when Liu adds his voice to those currently calling 
for a revival of China’s “militaristic spirit” (shangwu jingshen 尚武精神). China Dream presents this in 
the context of a grand historicist vision of the founding and decline of great dynasties, which is similar 
to the argument developed in Wolf Totem. Rather than looking to the warlike culture of China’s 
nomadic minorities, though, he looks to the founders of three great dynasties, Qin Shihuang, Han 
Wudi and Tang Taizong as models for using force for unification, going on the offense to expel 
enemies and combining soft with hard power. But Liu is careful to add that it was the CCP that revived 
the “militaristic spirit” most recently, as demonstrated by the Korean War. 
This is important, because when China Dream looks for an explanation of why the militaristic genes of 
the great founders degenerate, the answer is found in the corruption of the bureaucratic political elite 
and the enervating life style that comes with wealth and prosperity. The Song dynasty is thus singled 
out as the source of China’s “culture weakening” (wen rouhua 文弱化), because it centralised power in 
the Confucian bureaucracy in order to prevent the possibility of a military coup. The result was an 
emphasis on compromise and retreat in foreign affairs, a mainstream philosophy that emphasised 
peace at the expense of security, and a mistaken strategy of defending the south and neglecting the 
north that left the country open to attack. Overall, argues Liu, the dynasty that produced by far the 
largest number of theoretical texts on war craft ended up with a military that was bloated and lacking 
in quality. 
In this context, Zheng Bijian becomes just one representative of a much broader crisis afflicting 
China’s political elite. This is made very clear when the last section of the book consists of four 
chapters devoted to an exploration of the theory that China will collapse. One might expect Liu to 
dismiss such a theory at the end of a book celebrating China’s rise to world dominance. Instead, he 
quotes a warning given by Mao Zedong in 1956 that the most dangerous time for China would arrive 
40-50 years later, when the country would have to deal with the temptations of corruption, 
bureaucratism and great power chauvinism. He also cites Deng Xiaoping’s concerns over the threat to 
stability posed by growing inequality of wealth. Returning to his grand historicist cycle, Liu then cites a 
poem by Du Fu, of the Tang Dynasty, which attributes the demise of the Six Kingdoms and the Qin 
Dynasty to internal causes. 
Anger over corruption and inequality is of course widespread in China and makes up a significant part 
of a book like Unhappy China. What China Dream shows is that the military also has a voice in this 
clamour. Liu indicates that he is not alone in this respect when he cites an article carried in the press 
cuttings section of the PLA newspaper Jiefangjun bao, in 2009, listing the problematic areas in which 
China stands as number one in the world, such as the number of its bureaucrats, the cost of 
government administration, the amount of public money spent by officials and the accidental death 
rate. Neither does Liu pull his punches when he fixes the blame for this degeneration on the CCP, 
using the fate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union to show what happens when the founding 
generation of idealists is replaced by a group of people who pursue their own material interests. 
Rather than dismiss the theory of China’s collapse, then, Liu doubts whether a possible economic 
decline can be managed on the basis of growing inequality and corruption. This allows him to argue 
that domestic corruption and ossification (jianghua 僵化) are the problems that will obstruct the search 
for solutions to enormous domestic concerns like the greying of the population, rather than US-led 
Westernisation and division. 
When it comes to offering real solutions, however, aside from calling for “creativity” to solve the 
“three big contradictions” of the environment, society and international affairs, Liu does little more 
than side with the authoritarian and moralistic turn taking place in Chinese politics. At one point he 
adds to the still tentative calls for a strong leader that are now appearing in Chinese texts, pointing 
out that a rising nation needs a Lenin, Stalin, Mao or Deng to succeed. Interestingly, given current 
speculation over divisions between the Youth League and the Shanghai factions at the top of the 
Party, Liu even adds Jiang Zemin to this list of great dictators. 
In the context of a China that is now looking beyond the CCP for ideological inspiration, it is also 
notable that the figure of Sun Yatsen looms large throughout the book, although it is the National 
Father’s advocacy of Chinese racial superiority that is stressed, rather than his contribution to 
republican democracy. The paucity of this search for indigenous solutions is revealed, however, when 
Liu falls back on a foreign author like John Naisbitt’s popular China’s Megatrends, to argue for the 
possibility of a vertical, one-party “democracy with Chinese characteristics”. Again, such arguments 
are only interesting to Liu because they are compatible with his desire to build a political system that 
is superior to US democracy insofar as it can consolidate the use of power and creativity for the 
demands of national strategy. 
Yet it is the pessimistic conclusion of China Dream that is most striking, as Liu despairs that the 
present situation is worse than it was under Mao and that CCP rule will be challenged if corruption 
cannot be controlled. Even the creation of a stabilising welfare system seems impossible when CCP 
cadres are working with “two hands” – one to serve the people, one to help themselves. Yet Liu 
remains stuck on the horns of China’s political dilemma as he is unwilling to countenance the return to 
using mass political movements to combat corruption, while the alternative of multiparty democracy is 
condemned as part of an anti-Chinese US conspiracy. 
That the best Liu can do to inject a note of optimism into the conclusion of China Dream is to cite a 
number of quotes from Martin Jacques to confirm that China will not follow the fate of the Soviet 
Union because the CCP will remain in control and the Chinese government is imbued with a high 
degree of creativity, can only be taken as symptomatic of the conflicting emotions and political 
paradoxes that are reflected in the current spate of political literature from China. Yet, rather than 
expecting coherent theories and clear arguments, it is the ways in which nationalistic themes are 
adopted and deployed by numerous actors in the discourse of domestic politics that makes such texts 
so useful for gaining insights into China’s trajectory. In this respect Liu might have hit even more 
headlines around the world if he had given his book the title Unhappy PLA. 
Christopher R. Hughes is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science, where he specialises on the international poltics of the Asia-Pacific region, with 
special reference to Chinese foreign policy and its linkage with nationalism. His latest monograph 
is Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). 
 
